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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by 34 Plaintiffs to set aside 
and declare null and void the certain contracts which Plain-
hff s alleged were entered into by the fraudulent represen-
tations of the Def end ants or their assignors. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court at pretrial separated the claims into 
17 different separate trials. The trial for the claim of 
Russell S. and Dora Schow was had before a jury and sub-
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mitted on special interrogatories. At the close of all of 
the evidence the Defendants moved for a directed verdict. 
The trial court did not take this under advisement but 
rather denied the Defendants' motion. The jury on special 
inteTrogatories then found that there was clear and con-
vincing evidence of the fraudulent misrepresentations and 
actions of the Defendant, Guardtone, Inc. After the jury 
verdict, the Defendants moved for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict om the grounds that there was insuf. 
ficient evidence as a matteT of law to show that the De-
fendant, Guardtone, Inc. fraudulently intended not to per-
form the promises made at the time the contracts were 
undertaken. The trial court granted a motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that the 
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law and does not 
justify the verdict. 
REIJEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent wants the judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict rendered by the trial court to be set aside and 
that judiment be entered on the jury verdict 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellants on this appeal claim that they are one 
of a group of 17 couples who were contacted by a repre-
sentative of a Company which called itself Guardtane, and 
who were induced to purchase a fire alarm and interootn-
munication system called NuTone. They claim that the 
same methods were used in contacting each couple, that 
the representations made were fraudulent and false and 
that tttis i.s part of a general scheme by the iDefendallU 
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and a corrunon cOlll'se of action to defraud the Plaintiffs. 
The testimony showed that on or about the 8th day 
of September, 1962, Russell S. and Dora Schow were con-
tacted by Albert Hughes, who told the Schows that he rep-
resented a company called Guardtone. The Schows tes-
tified that Hughes represented to them that Guardtone of 
Utah was a separate corporation from Gua:rdtone, Inc., and 
was established to handle the Guardtone matters in Utah 
(T. 21, 47). 
The Schows further testified that Albert Hughes rep-
resented to the Schows that they had been selected to be 
advertisers of the Guardtone Company and that they could 
purchase this product at no cost to them by giving the 
company a list of names, referrals of their friends. They 
were to receive $400 for each 20 names that they referred 
to the Guardtone Company. Mr. Hughes represented that 
he would contact them and that the Schows w'ould get this 
money after he had contacted each group of 20 people. 
He told them that they would receive $400 for each 20 
people contacted regardless of whether the salesman was 
able to make a sale. 
Subsequently the company did not perform on its 
agreement to contact these people and to pay the Schows 
the money. The Schows testified that they made repeated 
effort to cooperate with and aid the company by making 
specific appointments with their friends and confirming 
th~ appointments with representa:tives of the company 
so that Guardtone could perform its part of the agreement. 
The Schows also testified that no salesman or representa-
tives contacted the people on the list, they did not keep 
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the appointments which the Schows made for them and 
they did not pay the money they said they WIOuld pay, 
The Plaintiff tendered proof to the court that the De-
fendants have followed a similar course of dealings with 
the other Plaintiffs, that they had similarly not performed 
and that this was therefore a part of a common or general 
scheme and plan to defraud the Plaintiffs and that the De-
fendants had no intention of performing their agreements. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A 
JUDGMENT N01WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT FOR 
THE REASON THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS sum. 
CIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DEFEND-
ANT, GUARDTONE, INC., DllD NOT INTEND TO PER· 
FORM THE PROMISE THAT THE PLAINTIFFS 
WOULD RECEIVE THE PROMISED SUMS UNDER THE 
ADVERTISING CONTRACT TO PAY FOR THE EQUIP· 
MENT PURCHASED BY THiE PLAINTIFFS. 
The testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Schow clearly showro 
that Albert Hughes promised that the Guardtone Company 
would pay $400.00 for each twenty names that Hughei 
contacted (Transcript Pages 19, 48, 71). The advertising 
agreement, which is Exhibit "A" of the Plaintiffs' com· 
plaint, and includes Pages 9 and 10 of the record, clea.r!Y 
and effectively substantiates the representation. 
The Schows' testimony shows that they earnestlY at· 
teiripted to perform their part of the agreement. TheY 
ga\re Mr. Hughes 41 names on Saturday, September 8, 1962 
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ITr. Pages 25, 77, Exhibit 7); an interim set of forty names 
sometime shortly thereafter (Tr. Page 77); and a final list 
of 44 names on October 26, 1962, (which is Exhibit 8, Tran-
script Pages 29, 77). As the testimony, the Guardtone 
Advertising Agreement, and the record clearly show, only 
two s£t of names were required and the Plaintiffs faithfully 
performed their part of the obligation by providing an extra 
set of names, for a total of three sets (Tr. P:ages 54, 77). 
After performing as they were required to do, the 
Schows then gave the Guardtone representatives time to 
perform. Hughes had represented to them, and ,the Ad-
vertising Agreements specifically state that it may take 
some time to make the contacts. 
It was during this waiting period that it became appar-
ent that the Guardtone people, from the outset, had never 
intended to perform as they represented. Their tactics 
consisted of evasion rather than apology, and this was 
punctuated by the fact that the telephone number of Guard-
tone was changed a number of times and was finally dis-
connected (Tr. P. 86). This was further shown by the 
disappearance of Albert Hughes. The sheriff was unable 
to serve him, and he did not appear at the trial. 
But the most important testimony in the case con-
cerning the intent of the Guardtone representatives, was 
the testimony concerning the evasion tactics by which the 
Guardtone people made definite appointments for salesman 
to call on a prospective customer and then repeatedly failed 
to show. Mr. Schow stated (Tr. P. 30): 
"We even went so far as to pay our own telephone bill 
expense from here to Salt Lake, or from Pleasant 
Grorve to Salt Lake, and made three definite appoint-
6 
ments for a salesman to call on this particular pa.rt 
because he was interested in one of these, and ~· 
wouldn't even keep the appointments that they mad: 
Whrn we called and asked thEm to come." 
The final telling blow to the Schows and the conclu-
sion of this group of incidents is that they did not receive 
the payments promised (Tr. P. 31). 
The applicable law for these facts is appropriately 
stated in 24 Am. Jur., Sec. 263, P. 96ff. 
"Ordiriarily, intent to deceive is not susceptible of di-
rect proof, but can be established only by circumstan. 
tial evidence." (Page 97) 
"An intention not to perform may be inferred from the 
fact that, after performance by the promisee, the prom· 
isor does not even make a pretense of carrying out his 
promise, or evades and refuses to perform it." (Page 
98) 
An extended discussion of the law applicable to a fact 
situation where the promisor doesn't even make a pre-
tense of performnig the contract or when he evades or re-
fuSes ·responsibility, is found in the case of Foster vs. Dwire 
at 51 A.L.R., Page 21, and in particular the annotation 
discussion starting on Page 163. This annotation has bren 
supplemented at 68 A.L.R. 648, 91 A.L.R. 1306, and 125 
A.L.R. 892. The facts of the Foster case indicated that 
the plaintiff made a promise to remedy deficiencies in a 
certain heating system. He subsequently made no attempt 
to do any repair or modification work and the Court said 
that this was sufficient evidence to infer that he had no 
intent to pmorm his promise at the time that it was made. 
The facts. of. the. case beiore this Court are even stronger 
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than those in the Dwire cacse, because the Guardtone rep-
resentative made several representations as to appoint-
mencs to make contacts with people on the list submitted 
to Guardtone, and even failed to keep those appointments. 
Th.is is even stronger evidence of the Guardtone represen-
tative's bad faith. 
The other subject cases of the annotation go at least 
as far as to state that the non-performance without even 
a pretense of performance is a sufficient basis for the 
requisite intent in fraud. 
Appellant draws the Court's attention to the Utah 
law in the 1935 case of Nielson vs. Leamington Mines & 
Exploration Corp<>ration at 87 Utah 69. In that case 
the Court by way of dicta stated rthat non-performance 
alone is not sufficient evidence of the fraud. The Court 
stated further on Page 78: 
"The evidence in this case fails to show any lack of 
good faith in making the contract or any intent on 
Garn's part not to perform his agreements, assuming 
that the agreement relied on by plaintiff was made. 
A conscientious effort was made by Garn with the 
assistance of plaintiff and his father to sell stock and 
to promote the development of the mining proper-
ties." 
The testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Schow shows clearly 
that the Nielson case is not applicable to the present 
facts. In the Nielson case, the promisor made consistent 
efforts subsequent to the promise, to perform the agree-
ment as was agreed to. In the case at hand, the Schows 
elicited the subsequent promises to attend appointments 
Which the Schows bad specifically made for the Guardtone 
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representatives and which the Guardtone representatives 
had represented that they would perform. The subsequent 
evasion of responsibility, the later apparent insolvency of 
Guardtone of Utah Inc., while its alteT ego, Guardtone, 
Inc., still exists, and the utter lack of performance in this 
case is compelling evidence of the bad faith of the Guarct. 
tone representatives. 
In this ,action, the above facts were submitted to the 
jury for their consideration. The trial court had previ-
ously denied a motion for a directed verdict. He submit-
ted the case to the jury on special interrogatories. The 
instructions specifically explained the meaning of clear and 
convincing evidence, and informed the jury that the evi-
dence must meet this criteria in order to find for Plain· 
tiffs. 
The jury then brought in a verdict for Plaintiff on the 
issues of fraud. 
This Court has discussed fraud cases extensively in 
the past. It has held that a jury may find fraud and meet 
the criteria m clear and convincing even when the testi· 
mony is in sharp disagreement. See Stuck v. Delta Land 
and Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791, at 63 Utah 
525. Yet, in this case there was no conflicting testimony 
on the issues of fraud or intent to defraud. The testimony 
if believed contained a harsh indictment of the practices 
of the Guardtooe -representatives, and provided a legal 
basis for the finding of intentional fraud. 
This Court has been loath to overturn the jury's find· 
ings on the credibility of witnesses. See Brunson vs. 
Strong, recently decided by this Court. 
Therefore, to overturn the jury verdict is to eliJJlinate 
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their function in a fraud case, where, as here, the testi-
mony was legally sufficient if believed. 
Appellant, therefore, submits that the lower court 
erred, and that the testimony and jury verdict are legally 
sufficient, and that, therefore, the action should be re-
versed and judgment entered on the verdict without a new 
t1ial. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN SEPARATING THE PLAIN-
TIFFS' CLAIMS FOR TRIAL AND IN EXCLUDING EV-
tJDENCE OF IDENTICAL FRAUDULENT PROMISES 
AND NON-PERFORMANCE. 
The very essence of the Plaintiffs' claim is that the 
Guardtone people had a geneTal fraudulent and false scheme 
and followed a common course of action to defraud each 
and all of the Plaintiffs. It is the Plaintiffs' contention 
that where the Guardtone representatives made identical 
promises and representations to each of the Plaintiffs and 
then failed to perform in each case in an identical man-
ner, that this is net only relevant and material evidence of 
fraud and the intent to defraud, but that it would be com-
pelling evidence of the intent to defraud. 
Plaintiffs' counsel made his offer of proof of these 
matters on Pages 98, 99, 100 and 101. 
The law on the subject is succinctly stated at 24 Am. 
Jur., Sec. 270, Page 109, and pages following. That rule 
is stated as: 
"One of the fundamental principles of relevancy which 
excludes evidence of other acts, even of a similar na-
ture, by the party charged with the commission of a 
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particular act, is subject to the limitation that wh 
one's motive or intent is an issue, his acts, statemen~ 
and conduct on other occasions which have a bearin' 
upon his motive or intention upon the occasion in que; 
tion are competent evidence. The limitation is applied 
extensively in fraud cases where intent, knowledge, 
and scienter so often constitute Essential elements of 
fraud. . Similar frauds committed by a person 
charged in a civil action with the commission of a 
fraud are admissible against him upon the issue of mo-
tive, intent, or scienter, provided it may be reasonably 
inferred that the motive which prompted him to com-
mit the fraud offered in proof was the same as that 
which directed him in committing the fraud charged 
in the action. Subsequent frauds are well as frauds 
committed prior to the fraud charged are within such 
rule." 
The Utah law on this subject is in emphatic agreement 
with the above rule. In Ogden Valley Trout & Resort 
Company vs. Lewis, at 41 Utah 183, 125 Pac. 687, the issue 
of other representations was clearly discussed. The Court 
summarizes that rule on Page 195: 
"Statements or representations made to others are. 
however, relevant where the intent, motive, or know!· 
edge of the falsity of the representations of the party 
making them are material, or to prove a system or 
general plan or scheme to defraud." 
Extensive authority and discussion follows. 
This rule was upheld in the Utah case of Smith vs. 
Gilbert, 49 Utah 510, 163 P. 1026. 
Since this appeal is based upon the trial court's failure 
to find a fraudulent intent, the testimony which was of· 
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fered was clearly relevant, and the court's exclusion con-
stitutes reversible error. 
Should this Court deny Appellants' request to set aside 
the Judgment notwithstanding the verdict, then Appellant 
requests a new trial on the ground of the eITOI' in exclu,.. 
sion of the offered testimony. 
POINT ill 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF GUARDTONE, INC., AND PRUDENTIAL 
FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION WITH-
OUT PROOF OF THEIR CLAIM OR DERIVATION OF 
THEIR PURPORTED ASSIGNMENT. 
Mr. and Mrs. Schow testified that they dealt with 
Guardtone of Utah (Tr. P. 21, 47). This was shown by 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2. The original of that contract is ~ 
fendants' Exhibit 11. It has been changed and the name 
of Guardtone of Utah, Inc., has. 'been. scratched out and 
Guardtone, Inc. and the initials W.V JD. are substituted · 
therefor. 
Under the general rules of contract law, Defendants: 
had an obligation to Guardtone of Utah, Inc. Under the 
gen2ral laws of assignment, when an asmgnee claims . 
that he holds a contract right assigned from another~ 
the law holds, and rightfully so, that tlhe promisor has a 
right to protect himself by insisting upon an adequate 
showing that he is paying the right person, i e. that the 
~ignee is a bona fide assignee and that th.el obligation . 
is owed to the assignee rather than the assignor. It is 
ridiculous to claim that a promisor could be estopped from 
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this privilege of protecting himself by the mere fact of 
payment or other performance to the assignee when he 
relies upon the assignee's representations. To hold that 
the payment would be a sufficient estoppel would be to say 
that the wrong doer, the assignee, by virtue of his false 
representations, could legally legitimize his representations 
by procuring e. reliance upon them. This has the legal 
unfortunate effect of obligating the promisor not only to 
the fraudulent assignee, but also to the promissee under 
the contract who still has a valid claim against the prom-
isor. The law is not and should not be that the prootisor 
is obligated and bound irrevocably to make payments to 
anyone who asserts a claim without a proof of authority. 
In the action at hand, the Schows contracted with Guard-
tone of Utah, Inc. Presently, the Defendant, Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan Association, is claiming to be 
assignee from Guardtone, Inc. Prudential has stated in 
its interrogatories that it had no dealings with Guardtone 
of Utah, Inc. (Answers to Interrogatories, Record on Ap-
peal, Page 80). 
Since Guardtone of Utah, Inc. is in default this issue 
also beoomes material to Plaintiff's right of execution 
against Guardtone of Utah, Inc. If Guardtone of Utah, Inc. 
does still hold the ownership in this purchase contract, then 
the Schows may execute on this contract. 
This is further emphasized by the fact that Utah law 
holds that if the defunct Guardtone of Utah, Inc. did ac· 
tually purport to convey ownership of the contract while 
it had the obvious outstanding obligations on the adver· 
tising agreements, then the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance 
Act makes that conveyance void. See Utah Code Ann°" 
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tated 25-1-8. This would negate the claim of Guardtone, 
Inc. and Prudential and properly place the responsibility 
with Guardtone of Utah, Inc. which is in default on the 
issue of fraud and has very obviously violated and breached 
the contract which it made. 
Nevertheless, both Prudential and Guardtone, Inc. 
have refused to show that their claim was bona fide as-
signed or transferred to them from Guard.tone of Utah, 
Inc. 
The law on this subject can be found at 6 Am. Jur. 2d 
317, Section 136: 
"In actions upon assigned claims, the rules and prin-
ciples of evidence applicable to civil actions generally 
apply. The party who asserts the affirmative of any 
i§ue raised therein has the burden of proving that 
issue, usually by a preponderance of the evidence, al-
though a higher degree of proof may be required as 
to particular issues such as fraud. He may be assis-
ted by certain presumptions, for example, an assign-
ment in writing or an absolute assignment may be 
preswned to be supported by a sufficient considera-
tion. 
However, authority of a corporate officer to make an 
assignment of indebtedness due to the corporation will 
not be presumed; it must be proved. And there is no 
presumption of an ~ignment which arises from the 
mere pas.session of a chose in action. 
Unless the defendants admit the assignment under 
which the plaintiff claims, it is incumbent upon ·the 
plaintiff to prove a valid assignment in order to show 
that he has a cause of action." 
In the case of Brown v. ~posito, 157 Pa. Super. 147, 
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42 Atlantic 2d 93, the Pennsylvania Court stated the rea. 
son for the rule as follows, page 94: 
"When suit is brought against the defendant by a stran. 
ger to his contract, he is entitled to proof that the 
plaintiff is the owner of the claim against him. This 
protection must be afforded the defendant. Otherwise, 
the defendant might find himself subjected to the same 
liability to the original owner of the cause of action, in 
the event that there was no actual ~gnment." 
The case of Mountain Stat.es Wat.er Company v. Town 
of KingwOOd, West Vuginia., 1 S.E. 2d 395, page 398, the 
Court states the rule as follows: 
"Usually, an assignee must, by appropriate allegations, 
trace his title to the thing signed. 4 Am. Jur. 330, 
Section 26; 5 C. J. 1008 Section 224. While it is op-
tional whether he institute the proceeding in his own 
name, or in that of his assignor (Skraggs v. Hill, 37 
West Virginia, 706, 712, 17 S.E. 185) if brought in 
his own name, then the declaration or notice must 
set forth the assignment so as to trace title in the 
plaintiff.'' 
It is clear in the present case that Prudential 1Federal 
Savings and Loan Association acquired no title by reason 
of its purported assignment, since the corporation it dealt ' 
with was Guardtone, Inc., who in fact, had no contract or 
interest in a contract to assign. It is further clear that 
the contract had been altered without the knowledge or 
consent of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs therefore respectfUUY 
submit that where these two Defendants have not shown a 
valid claim by a preponderance of the evidence or by any 
evidence at all, that they have no claim in law for a judg· 
ment in their favor against the Defendants. 
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CONCLUSION 
The jury verdict should be reinstated and judgment 
2ntered thereon. In the alternative, the case should be 
remanded to the lower court for a new trial, with direc-
tions to the lower court concerning proper admissibility of 
evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. REX LEWIS 
HOW ARD AND LEWIS 
Delphi Building 
120 East Third North 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
